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NOTE
“TRADITIONAL” RESOURCE USES
AND ACTIVITIES: ARTICULATING
VALUES AND EXAMINING
CONFLICTS IN ALASKA
This Note examines the meaning of “tradition” in the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(“ANILCA”) and the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(“MMPA”), two federal laws of particular importance in
Alaska, and in Alaska state law relating to land and natural
resource use. The Note draws upon a variety of sources, including the texts of those laws, judicial decisions and agency
interpretative regulations. The Note argues that the term
“tradition” should be defined and interpreted by paying attention to the potentially competing values associated with
the term and raises the question of which institution or entity
is best suited to interpret tradition in particular contexts.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Alaskan natural resource law, “tradition” is a powerful legal concept, appearing in a bewildering variety of contexts in Alaskan law and legal discourse relating to natural resource and public
lands activities. The concept of tradition invokes a spectrum of
underlying values, sometimes complementary, sometimes competing. Both state and federal natural resource and land use laws pertaining to Alaska assign privileges and exemptions for individuals
engaging in “traditional activities” and “traditional uses” of land
and resources. However, in spite of its prevalence in statutory law,
the term “tradition” is rarely defined, and the underlying values to
be protected are rarely identified explicitly. Instead, use of the
word seems more often to be accompanied by an implicit assumption that both the meaning and the inherent worth of “tradition”
are obvious. Failure to define the term in statutory law has given
rise to problematic and inconsistent results as courts, administrators and other decision-makers attempt to strike appropriate balances between implicit, often competing, values.
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This Note begins by examining a decision of the Alaska District Court, Alaska State Snowmobile Association, Inc. v. Babbitt,1
as an example of the problems created by the failure to define
“tradition” as applied to resource uses and activities. Next, it discusses use of the term in legal rules governing natural resource use
in Alaska. Finally, the Note analyzes the values associated with the
term in a natural resources context and discusses the problems that
have arisen as decision-makers have attempted to strike proper
balances among competing values. The Note closes by raising the
question: which institution or entity should decide what tradition
means? This Note does not assert that a single meaning for tradition in state and federal law is necessary or even desirable. Rather,
it suggests that tradition should be defined and interpreted with
deliberate attention to the full spectrum of potential values the
term may represent and in light of the ends that may be attained by
investing tradition with each of its possible meanings.
II. COMPETING VALUES INVOKED BY TRADITION:
ALASKA STATE SNOWMOBILE ASSOCIATION V. BABBITT
Although the issue of the proper interpretation of “tradition”
and “traditional activities” is not new to Alaska courts, a recent decision by a federal district court illustrates the critical need for
more definition. In Alaska State Snowmobile Association, Inc. v.
2
Babbitt, the Alaska State Snowmobile Association (“ASSA”) and
individual plaintiffs brought suit against the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Interior, the Director of the U.S. National Park
3
Service (“NPS”) and other defendants responsible for managing
Denali National Park after the NPS temporarily closed the wilderness core of Denali to snowmobiling activities. ASSA alleged that
the temporary closure violated Section 1110(a) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”), which allows access by snowmachines and other forms of transportation to
Copyright © 2002 by Jennifer L. Tomsen. This Note is also available on the
Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/19ALRTomsen.
The author is a member of the Class of 2002 at Duke University School of
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Jonathan Wiener of Duke University for his criticism of this Note, and Bob Randall of Trustees for Alaska and
Dean Dunsmore of the Department of Justice for providing helpful resources.
1. 79 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Alaska 1999), vacated, Alaska State Snowmobile
Ass’n, Inc. v. Babbitt, No. 00-35113, 2001 WL 770442 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2001); see
infra note 19.
2. Id.
3. For simplicity, in this Note the defendants are referred to collectively as
the National Park Service (“NPS”).
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otherwise restricted-access areas of conservation system units, including Denali, for “traditional activities . . . and for travel to and
4
from villages and homesites.” ASSA argued that its members’ use
of snowmachines for recreational purposes such as sightseeing and
backcountry camping were traditional activities under Section
5
1110(a). NPS, on the basis of a previous administrative order defining traditional activities to be those “regularly practiced in the
6
[wilderness core of Denali] before the 1980 passage of ANILCA,”
argued that because snowmachines were not lawfully used for recreation in the area before 1980, such recreational uses were not
7
traditional.
Because ANILCA does not define what activities will be con8
sidered traditional, the district court had to determine whether
ASSA had standing to sue. A frustrated Judge Sedwick answered
that ASSA had standing after examining the “murky” history of
9
NPS’s treatment of the issue of snowmachine use in Denali. The
court stated that “a review of the Administrative Record cannot
but lead to the uncomfortable conclusion that [NPS] has no formally established position (and perhaps not even an informally established position that is both current and coherent) of what consti10
tutes ‘traditional activities’ within the meaning of ANILCA.” The
court noted that “[NPS’s] failure to define ‘traditional activities’
makes it impossible for the court to hold now that ‘sightseeing, experiencing solitude, practicing photography, and enjoying backcountry camping, the wilderness experience, and other traditional
activities’” as described by ASSA “do not embrace at least one
11
‘traditional activity’ within the meaning of ANILCA.” The court
4. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”), Pub. L.
No. 96-487, § 1110, 94 Stat. 2371, 2464-65 (1980), 16 U.S.C. § 3170(a) (2000).
Privileged access under this section may be withheld where such uses would be
detrimental to the area’s resource values. Id.
5. Alaska State Snowmobile Ass’n, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 n.53.
6. Id. at 1121 (quoting from the administrative order).
7. Oral Argument on Pending Summary Judgment Motions at 14, Alaska
State Snowmobile Ass’n, Inc. v. Babbit, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Alaska 1999) (No.
A99-0059-CV) (statement of Dean Dunsmore for defendants).
8. Amendments to ANILCA in 1997, subsequently repealed (see infra note
71), defined “customary and traditional uses” of resources for subsistence purposes, but there is no indication that the definition was meant to clarify the
meaning of “traditional activities” as used elsewhere in the statute. Pub. L. No.
105-83, § 316(b)(4), 111 Stat. 1543, 1592-93 (1997) (repealed 1998); see Alaska
State Snowmobile Ass’n, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
9. Alaska State Snowmobile Ass’n, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
10. Id. at 1142.
11. Id. at 1125 n.53.
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ultimately decided that the closure order was arbitrary and capricious and declared that it violated ANILCA.12
A proposed NPS rule defining traditional activities was issued
in the wake of the Snowmobile decision and prompted a flood of
13
public comment from interested parties. At the heart of this debate, still ongoing, is fundamental disagreement among regulatory
authorities and stakeholders over the interests that invocation of
tradition should address. The proposed rule defines a traditional
activity as one that “generally” occurred in a conservation unit before ANILCA’s enactment “and that was typically associated with
that region as an integral and established part of a utilitarian
14
Alaska lifestyle or cultural pattern.” This definition suggested
that for NPS, the values to be protected by invoking tradition are
sociocultural; the definition did not appear to contemplate sport or
15
recreational uses. ASSA, on the other hand, advocated a meaning
for tradition in which the key element is simply some level of historical continuity: so long as activities were practiced before the
“cutoff date” of ANILCA’s passage in 1980, their purpose or sociocultural significance is irrelevant.
In response to comments from the Alaska Legislature and
Alaska’s Governor, NPS modified the proposed definition to re16
move the association of traditional activities with culture. The Final Rule defines a traditional activity as:
[a]n activity that generally and lawfully occurred in the Old Park
[the wilderness portion of what is now Denali] contemporaneously with the enactment of ANILCA, and that was associated
with the Old Park, or a discrete portion thereof, involving the
consumptive use of one or more natural resources of the Old
Park such as hunting, trapping, fishing, berry picking or similar
17
activities.

The Final Rule thus rejects a solely sociocultural rationale for
exemptions to NPS’s access restrictions but imposes more than a
simple “historical continuity” rationale. However, although the
explicit reference to culture was deleted, an implicit sociocultural
12. Id. at 1146.
13. NPS received 6,039 timely comments, of which 39% were from Alaska
residents. Of 3,176 comments regarding the proposed definition of traditional activities, 98% were “supporting.” National Park System Units in Alaska; Denali
National Park and Preserve, Special Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,863, 37,868
(June 19, 2000) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 13).
14. Id. at 37,866.
15. This Note uses the term “sociocultural” to refer to values relating to distinct ethnic groups and those groups’ senses of community and identity.
16. National Park System Units in Alaska, 65 Fed. Reg. at 37,869.
17. Id. at 37,866.

TOMSEN_FMT.DOC

2002]

05/01/02 9:50 AM

“TRADITIONAL” RESOURCE USES

171

rationale still exists. Supplementary material accompanying the
Final Rule states: “This consumptive use [referenced in the Final
Rule’s definition of traditional activities] is part of a life style or
cultural pattern that remain [sic] practical and essential compo18
nents of subarctic life.” From NPS’s perspective, recreational activities such as snowmobiling lack the sociocultural dimension that
19
the agency seems to consider a necessary component of tradition.
These fundamental conflicts between competing values associated with the idea of tradition continued for some time in litigation
20
over the definition of traditional activities in NPS’s Final Rule.
NPS limited the Final Rule’s applicability to the wilderness portion
of Denali National Park and stated that for other conservation
units in Alaska, the meaning of traditional activities must be de21
fined on an area-by-area basis. Yet this approach merely postpones the inevitable. Because neither Congress nor NPS has explicitly articulated the underlying values to be protected by
invoking tradition, the controversy accompanying the closure order
in the Snowmobile case will surely arise again as NPS makes tradi22
tional activity determinations for other conservation units.
Nor is the scope of controversy limited to traditional activity
determinations under ANILCA. State law, for the most part,
tracks the language of ANILCA but does not necessarily or even
apparently intend to invest similar meaning in the idea of tradi18. Id. at 37,867.
19. The temporary closure order that initiated the Snowmobile case appears
to justify its exclusion of snowmachine uses from the category of traditional activities solely on a historical continuity rationale:
The legal use of mechanized equipment for winter recreation by
the general public never occurred in the core 2 million acres of
Denali National Park and Preserve from 1917 to 1980. In fact,
this portion of the park . . . was specifically closed to public recreational snowmachine use by a nationwide regulation in 1972.
79 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (quoting from the temporary closure order).
20. After months of settlement negotiations, the ASSA and the other plaintiffs in the snowmobile litigation dismissed their lawsuit, opting instead to proffer
legislation that would allow recreational use of snowmobiles in some portions of
the Denali wilderness. See Trustees for Alaska updates at http://www.trustees.org
/DenaliNationalParkArticles.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2002); see also Alaska State
Snowmobile Ass’n, Inc. v. Babbitt, No. 00-35113, 2001 WL 770442 (9th Cir. Jan.
10. 2001) (vacating district court’s judgment and dismissing appeal as moot).
21. National Park System Units in Alaska, 65 Fed. Reg. at 37,866.
22. NPS has said that it “intends to define traditional activities and apply such
definitions to other park areas.” Id. at 37,867. In addition, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service regulations governing public land in wildlife refuges generally track
ANILCA’s Section 1110(a) language. Id. at 37,865.
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tional activities. The Marine Mammal Protection Act, aimed primarily at the conservation of threatened and endangered species,
and other federal natural resource laws also invoke tradition but
are so different in purpose from ANILCA that tradition under
these laws may embody quite different values.
III. “TRADITION” IN ALASKA
This section provides an overview of the concept of tradition
in state and federal law affecting Alaskan public lands and resources. Tradition appears both as an adjective describing a particular kind of resource activity or land use (e.g., traditional activities) and as part of a phrase that defines a particular kind of activity
(e.g., subsistence activities defined as “customary and traditional
uses” of land and resources). This overview is not exhaustive but
illustrates the variety of contexts in which tradition appears and
highlights the ways in which contextual differences suggest different underlying meanings for the term “tradition.”
A. Tradition in Federal Laws Affecting Alaska: ANILCA and
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”)
The primary federal law affecting public lands and resources in
23
Alaska is the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(“ANILCA”), passed in 1980 to preserve from development cer24
tain lands of natural, historic, recreational or scientific value.
ANILCA was intended to guide the completion of federal land allocation within Alaska while satisfying Alaskans’ economic and so25
cial needs. The law established the Alaska national park system,
creating thirteen of Alaska’s fifteen national park units and designating other types of public land, such as national wildlife refuges
26
and national forests. ANILCA provided for state implementation
of its provisions, giving Alaska the ability to control the regulation
of fish and game on federal lands within the state (more than sixty
percent of all public land), but it made this power contingent upon
the consistency of state law with ANILCA’s subsistence provi27
ANILCA’s influence over public land management in
sions.
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233, 410hh-410hh-5 (2000).
24. ANILCA, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (2000)).
25. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 549-51 (1987) (discussing ANILCA’s purposes).
26. Id.
27. Mary Beth McLeod, The Subsistance [sic] Debate in Alaska: Who Will
Control Navigable Waters?, 3 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 355, 358
(1996). Currently, state law does not conform to ANILCA’s provisions regarding
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Alaska is therefore especially broad because state laws regulating
subsistence uses on state-owned land were written or modified to
28
accord with ANILCA’s provisions.
The concept of tradition appears in ANILCA in numerous
provisions guaranteeing access for traditional activities to otherwise off-limits public lands. Such provisions include access for sub29
30
sistence purposes, for recreational uses, for travel to villages and
31
homesites and for travel to cabins to be used for “traditional and
32
customary uses.” The provision governing access to subsistence
resources in park areas, for example, allows means of surface
transportation “traditionally employed” for subsistence purposes;
snowmobiles, motorboats and dog teams are expressly mentioned
33
as permitted modes of transport.
Tradition is also incorporated throughout ANILCA in reference to subsistence activities themselves. ANILCA defines subsistence uses not in terms of activities necessary for survival but by
reference to tradition, as the “customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska residents” of resources for personal or family consumption and use, for making and selling handicrafts, for barter or
sharing for personal or family consumption and for “customary”
34
trade. ANILCA extends protections for such activities not only to
35
36
Alaska Natives but also to non-Natives. Although many individuals depend upon subsistence activities for their livelihood or
sustenance, Congress also recognized a sociocultural role for subrural residency, and therefore the federal government has taken over management
of fish and game on federal public lands and waters. Alaska Governor Tony
Knowles and the state resource departments are attempting to pass ballot initiatives to amend the state constitution to conform to ANILCA, thereby returning
management of resources on federal public lands to the state.
28. Ryan T. Peel, Comment, Katie John v. United States: Balancing Alaskan
State Sovereignty with a Native Grandmother’s Right to Fish, 15 BYU J. PUB. L.
263, 268-69 (2001).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2000).
30. Id. § 3170(a).
31. Id. § 3170(b).
32. Id. § 3193(b)(2).
33. Id. § 3121(b).
34. Id. § 3113.
35. In this Note, “Native” is capitalized where it refers specifically to those
peoples regarded as indigenous to Alaska: Eskimo, Aleut and American Indian.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1), (2) (2000). Currently, more than half of the people
who qualify for subsistence are non-Natives. Robert Wolfe, Subsistence Division
of Alaska Department of Fish and Game, What Have You Heard?, http://
www.state.ak.us/local/akpages/FISH.GAME/subsist/geninfo/about/subfaq.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
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sistence activities, finding that subsistence activities are essential to
“economic, traditional, and cultural existence” for Natives and to
37
“economic, traditional, and social existence” for non-Natives.
ANILCA provides a preference for subsistence uses whenever
it becomes necessary to protect wild populations by restricting the
taking of fish and wildlife on public lands; priority for subsistence
uses is to be established by considering people’s dependency upon
the resource, local residency and the availability of alternative re38
sources. Regulations implementing ANILCA’s subsistence provisions state that subsistence uses by local rural residents “shall be
the priority consumptive uses of such resources over any other con39
Amendments to
sumptive uses” permitted in park areas.
ANILCA adopted in 1997 but subsequently repealed in 1998 were
intended to clarify the meaning of “customary and traditional uses”
and “customary trade” in the definition of subsistence activities.
The amendments provided:
“customary and traditional uses” means the noncommercial,
long-term, and consistent taking of, use of, or reliance upon fish
and wildlife in a specific area and the patterns and practices of
taking or use of that fish and wildlife that have been established
over a reasonable period of time,40taking into consideration the
availability of the fish and wildlife.

The amendments defined “customary trade” to mean “the limited
noncommercial exchange for money of fish and wildlife or their
41
parts in minimal quantities.”

37. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (2000).
38. Id. § 3114. A current proposed state constitutional amendment would
raise the subsistence preference to the status of a constitutional right. The first
sentence of the proposal inserts the familiar “customary and traditional” language
into the “Sustained Yield” clause of the Alaska Constitution, declaring it to be the
“policy of the State of Alaska . . . to recognize the subsistence tradition of the indigenous peoples of Alaska and to accord a priority to customary and traditional
subsistence uses in the allocation of fish, game and other renewable resources.”
Draft Resolution prepared by the Subsistence Working Group on December 15,
2001, available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/subsistencesummit/resolution.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
39. National Park System Units in Alaska, 36 C.F.R. § 13.40(c) (2001).
40. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-83, § 316(b)(4)(C), 111 Stat. 1592, 1592-93 (1997) (repealed 1998).
Section 316(d) of ANILCA provided that the amendments in subsection (b)
would be effective only if Alaska adopted such laws by December 1, 1998; because
Alaska did not do so, the amendments were repealed. They are discussed here
because they provide additional insight into the ways in which tradition has been
conceptualized in statutory law.
41. Id.
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Like ANILCA, the Marine Mammal Protection Act42
(“MMPA”) invokes tradition as a basis for special privileges, but
unlike ANILCA, the MMPA extends those privileges only to
43
Alaska Natives. Under the MMPA, Alaska Natives may take
protected marine mammals such as seals, whales, and sea otters for
44
subsistence or for use in traditional native handicrafts. The statute defines authentic native articles of handicrafts and clothing as:
items composed wholly or in some significant respect of natural
materials, and which are produced, decorated, or fashioned in
the exercise of traditional native handicrafts without the use of
pantographs, multiple carvers, or other mass copying devices.
Traditional native handicrafts include, but are not limited to
weaving, carving, stitching, sewing, lacing, beading, drawing, and
45
painting.

The exemption for subsistence includes aboriginal subsistence
whaling, defined by the International Whaling Commission as
“whaling, for purposes of local aboriginal consumption carried out
by or on behalf of aboriginal, indigenous or native peoples who
share strong community, familial, social and cultural ties related to
a continuing traditional dependence on whaling and on the use of
46
whales.” The law also provides for local aboriginal consumption,
defined by the Commission as “the traditional uses of whale product by local aboriginal, indigenous or native communities in meet47
ing their nutritional, subsistence and cultural requirements.” By
limiting these exemptions to Alaska Natives, the MMPA emphasizes cultural and community values, a discrete subset of the spectrum of values embodied in the concept of tradition.

42. 16 U.S.C. § 1361-1421h (2000).
43. Id. § 1371(b).
44. Id. § 1371. Such takings must be done pursuant to cooperative agreements
with the Secretary of the Interior. Id. Similarly, the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”) exempts Alaska Natives from the law’s ban on the taking or importation
of endangered or threatened species, using the same terminology as the MMPA.
16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (2000).
45. Id. § 1371(b).
46. G.P. Donovan, International Whaling Commission and Aboriginal/Subsistence Whaling: April 1979 to July 1981, Special Issue 4, International
Whaling Commission, Cambridge, England (1981), available at http://www.highnorth.no/Library/Culture/de-of-ab.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2002). Report of the
Ad Hoc Technical Committee Working Group on Development of Management
Principles and Guidelines for Subsistence Catches of Whales by Indigenous (Aboriginal) Peoples.
47. Id.
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B. Tradition in Alaska State Law
Alaska state law also contains protections for traditional activities as well as access to public lands for those activities. Although there is still room for debate about the precise meaning of
tradition in various contexts, state law generally provides more
guidance than does ANILCA regarding what uses may be considered traditional. Alaska Statutes section 41.21.020(14) specifies
that managers of state parks, recreational areas and preserves must
maintain “traditional means of access” to those areas “for a tradi48
The provision defines traditional
tional recreational activity.”
recreational activities as “those personal or commercial types of activities that people may use for sport, exercise, subsistence, or personal enjoyment, including hunting, fishing, trapping, or gathering,
and that have historically been conducted as part of an individual,
49
family, or community life pattern” on state lands or waters. It
specifies that the means of access considered traditional are “those
types of transportation . . . for which a popular pattern of use has
developed.” The provision gives a non-exclusive list of permissible
means of transportation, including “general or commercial aviation, ballooning, motorized and nonmotorized boating, snowmachining, operation of all-terrain vehicles, mushing, use of pack
50
animals, skiing, snowshoeing, and walking.”
Other state law provisions protect traditional uses and means
of access specific to particular areas. For example, a provision relating to the Haines State Forest Resource Management Area declares that “an opportunity for continued traditional use . . . at levels and by traditional methods and means is guaranteed. The
traditionally compatible uses include but are not limited to fishing,
hunting, trapping, berry picking, subsistence, and recreational uses,
operation of motorized vehicles, and the harvest of personal-use
51
firewood.” In Wood-Tikchik State Park that “the current practice
of traditional subsistence and recreational activities includes the
52
use of small outboard motors and snow machines.”
These provisions demonstrate an intent to include a broad
range of activities as traditional; analogous provisions of ANILCA
are less clear about what the law contemplates. By adding the
word traditional as a modifier to the phrase “means of access,”
state law also makes clear, as ANILCA’s Section 1110(a) did not,
that both the means of access and the activity itself must be tradi48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

ALASKA STAT. § 41.21.020(14) (Michie 2000).
Id. § 41.21.020(14)(b). Section 38.04.200(a) contains a similar provision.
Id.
Id. § 41.15.315(b).
Id. § 41.21.167.
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tional to be protected. Similarly, state law pertaining to parks in
Alaska Statutes section 41.21.020 avoids at least one aspect of debate in the Snowmobile case, whether the meaning of tradition depends on the purpose of an activity, by specifying that its protections apply to traditional recreational activities. Thus, the state
legislature clearly contemplated that recreational activities could
be traditional on at least some public lands.
Elsewhere in state law, however, references to tradition are
less illuminating. Activities such as aquatic farming must be com53
patible with “traditional uses” of the area and management of
54
public use areas must consider traditional uses. Other provisions
specify that those responsible for certain development plans or ac55
tions must consider the effect on traditional uses of the land.
These and similar provisions fail to define or even to imply what
uses are to be considered traditional in each context.
Subsistence uses of resources provide a different framework
within which to analyze the meaning of tradition. Because state
56
law subsistence provisions largely mirror those of ANILCA, state
law defines subsistence by reference to tradition and extends exemptions for traditional activities to both Natives and non57
Natives. Subsistence uses in state law are defined as:
the noncommercial, customary and traditional uses of wild, renewable resources by a resident domiciled in a rural area of the
state for direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter,
fuel, clothing, tools, or transportation, for the making and selling
of handicraft articles out of nonedible by-products of fish and
wildlife resources taken for personal or family consumption, and
for the customary
trade, barter, or sharing for personal or family
58
consumption.

The provision defines “customary and traditional” as “the noncommercial, long-term, and consistent taking of, use of, and reliance upon fish or game in a specific area and the use patterns of
that fish or game that have been established over a reasonable period of time taking into consideration the availability of the fish or
game,” and “customary trade” as “limited noncommercial ex59
change, for minimal amounts of cash.” Whereas ANILCA de53. Id. § 38.05.083.
54. See, e.g., id. § 41.23.150; id. § 41.15.300.
55. See, e.g., id. § 38.05.830 (instructing that “the commissioner shall consider . . . [the] potential for conflicts with the traditional uses of the land that could
result from the sale, lease, or disposal”).
56. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 27, at 359.
57. 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 1, § 1(a)(3).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.940 (Michie 2000).
59. Id.
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fines subsistence uses as “customary and traditional uses by rural
Alaska residents,” state law adds the term “noncommercial” and
describes permissible purposes for subsistence activities: personal
or family consumption, making and selling of handicrafts, and
trade, barter and sharing for personal or family consumption.
Regulations of the Alaska Joint Boards of Fisheries and Game
(“Joint Boards” or “Boards”) go further than does ANILCA in defining customary and traditional subsistence uses of resources. To
enable the identification of fish stocks and game populations “cus60
tomarily and traditionally taken or used for subsistence,” the
Boards enacted detailed regulations specifying that customary and
traditional subsistence uses shall be characterized by: (1) a longterm, consistent and recurring pattern of noncommercial taking
and use; (2) methods of harvest characterized by efficiency and
economy of effort and cost; (3) means of handling, preparation,
preservation and storage of fish or game that have been traditionally used by past generations, not excluding appropriate technological advances; (4) handing down of knowledge, skills and values
from generation to generation; (5) distribution or sharing of effort,
catch or harvest, not including significant commercial enterprises;
and (6) a use pattern including reliance for subsistence purposes
upon a diversity of resources and which provides substantial eco61
nomic, cultural, social and nutritional elements of the user’s life.
IV. A MULTIPLICITY OF “TRADITIONAL” VALUES
IN ALASKAN RESOURCE LAW
A multiplicity of dimensions is associated with the term “tradition” in statutory and case law. The phrases “traditional activities”
and “traditional uses” incorporate one or more of (1) distance in
and continuity over time; (2) association with a particular culture
or community; or (3) a small scale. Each of these concepts promotes different underlying values and achieves different ends when
vested in the concept of tradition. This section explores these
meanings and asks: what do we accomplish when we protect tradition invested with a particular meaning?
Tradition is rarely, if ever, unidimensional; more often, it is a
multifaceted concept with layers of actual and potential meanings
and values. This section also examines conflicts among these
meanings and values. Such conflicts arise frequently as population
and development pressures engender increasingly stringent regula-

60. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (Michie 2000).
61. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 99.010(b) (1982) (paraphrased from the
regulation).

TOMSEN_FMT.DOC

2002]

05/01/02 9:50 AM

“TRADITIONAL” RESOURCE USES

179

tory measures with consequent changes in the nature of traditional
activities for Natives and non-Natives alike.62 This section examines the tradeoffs inherent in the balancing of traditional values
with each other and with other important values.
A. Tradition Defined by Distance In and Continuity Over Time
Of the concepts embodied in tradition, the idea that tradition
is based on longstanding practices is perhaps the most prevalent. A
“time” dimension for tradition is evident in the text or legislative
history of most Alaska-related statutes and regulations and in several judicial opinions interpreting statutory language. For example,
one criterion in the regulations of the Joint Boards defining “customary and traditional” subsistence uses is “a long-term . . . pattern
63
of use.” Subsistence uses, as previously defined under ANILCA,
similarly must be based on long-term patterns and practices of
64
taking or relying upon fish and wildlife.
An unresolved question is the length of time necessary before
a practice achieves the status of a tradition. The Joint Boards’
definition of customary and traditional subsistence uses suggests a
span of time covering many generations: the pattern of traditional
use must include the passing of knowledge, skills and values “from
generation to generation” and involve practices “traditionally used
65
by past generations.” These regulations clearly do not contemplate that practices covering a timespan of a few years or even a
few decades will qualify as traditional. Similarly, in the legislative
history of the 1992 amendments to the state subsistence laws, the
legislature stated that “customary and traditional uses of Alaska’s
66
fish and game originated with Alaska Natives,” dating back to a
far distant, pre-European settlement age. However, the position
taken by ASSA in the Snowmobile litigation contemplated a much
shorter timespan by including as traditional any activity that occurred in Denali’s wilderness core before ANILCA’s passage in
62. One member of an Alaska Native group explains: “Our lifestyle . . . has
changed, even our way of life . . . . Our dads, they would just go out hunting and
get however much our families need. But, today, . . . [the regulatory authorities]
tell us . . . how many to get.” David S. Case, Subsistence and Self-Determination:
Can Alaska Natives Have a More “Effective Voice”?, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 1009,
1013 (1989) (quoting Genevieve Norris from the village of Shungnak).
63. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 99.010(b)(1) (1982).
64. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act,
Publ. L. No. 105-83, 316(b)(4), 111 Stat. 1543, 1593 (1997) (repealed 1998).
65. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 99.010(b)(5)-(6) (1982).
66. 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 1, § 1(a)(3) (quoted in Payton v. State, 938 P.2d
1036, 1043 (Alaska 1997)).
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1980. Subsistence uses under state law and formerly under
ANILCA need only be based on patterns that have developed over
67
State law referring to non“a reasonable period of time.”
subsistence traditional activities gives very little guidance about the
timeframe the legislature envisioned: traditional recreational activities in state parks and traditional outdoor activities on other state
lands are those that have been done “historically” for long enough
to have become “part of an individual, family, or community life
68
pattern.” The traditional means of access protected by these provisions are no more ancient than the most recently developed
69
mode of transportation listed—all-terrain vehicles.
The time dimension of tradition typically requires not only the
passage of time but also the continuity and regularity of a practice
over time. A practice undertaken only sporadically, rather than as
a regular response to recurring conditions, ordinarily will not be
considered traditional. For example, the Joint Boards’ subsistence
regulations specifically require a pattern of use, defined as a consistent repetition of uses of wild resources that recur in specific sea70
sons every year. Subsistence activities under state law and the
temporary ANILCA amendments must be based on consistent pat71
terns of use over time.
In addition, both courts and legislatures seem to agree that
practitioners may update their methods without forfeiting otherwise traditional status for those activities. For example, one criterion of the Joint Boards’ regulations defining “customary and traditional” subsistence uses is a “means of handling, preparing,
preserving, and storing fish or game that has been traditionally
used by past generations, but not excluding recent technological
72
advances where appropriate.” The MMPA considers sewing and
stitching of natural materials to be traditional ways of making Native handicrafts, but regulations implementing the Act specifically
73
provide that sewing machines may be used. Such tolerance for an
updating of methods reflects a belief that some legitimate traditions may not necessarily satisfy a romanticized conception of what
is traditional. In responding to a question whether subsistence
67. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act §
316(b)(4)(C) (1997) (repealed 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.940(7) (Michie 2000).
68. ALASKA STAT. § 41.21.020 (Michie 2000).
69. Id.
70. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 99.010(b)(1) (1982).
71. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act §
316(b)(4)(C) (repealed 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.940(7) (Michie 2000).
72. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 99.010(b)(5) (1982).
73. 50 C.F.R. § 18.3 (2001).
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hunters were required to use a bow and arrow, the Subsistence Division of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game responded that
the use of guns was also traditional because Natives in Alaska had
hunted with guns since the 1860s in most areas, longer than Amer74
ica has been using automobiles for transportation. ANILCA allows individuals to use snowmachines to reach sites for traditional
75
activities and for transportation between villages and homesites,
even though dogsleds or pack animals more closely fit the popular
image of traditional means of transportation.
Many decisions to permit “updates” of methods appear to recognize that a strictly enforced time dimension for tradition may
place unrealistic expectations on those engaging in otherwise traditional activities. For example, some age-old practices are now prohibited by law. Both state and federal courts have determined that
individuals should not be penalized for employing “modern”
methods where some aspect of their otherwise traditional activity is
now prohibited. A case examining the Alaska Native handicraft
exemption to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, Didrickson v.
76
United States Department of the Interior, is the clearest illustration
of this principle. The record in the case demonstrated that Alaska
Natives had made many uses of sea otters before the occupation of
77
the area by Russians in the late 1700s. After the United States
purchased Alaska following more than a century of intensive
hunting of sea otters, the Fur Seal Treaty of 1910 prohibited all
78
hunting of the animals. The MMPA, passed in 1972, continued
protections for the sea otter but included an Alaska Native exemption, which allowed takings of the animals by any local Indian,
Aleut, or Eskimo to create authentic native articles “in the exercise
79
of traditional native handicrafts.” The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) subsequently issued regulations defining authentic native articles as those “commonly produced on or before De80
cember 21, 1972,” the date the MMPA took effect, and providing
that items created from sea otter pelts did not meet the exemption
because “Alaskan natives have apparently not commonly sold
81
handicrafts or clothing from sea otters within living memory.”
74. Wolfe, supra note 36.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 3170(a) (2000).
76. 796 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Alaska 1991).
77. Id. at 1289.
78. Id.
79. Marine Mammal Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 92-522 § 101(b)(2), 86 Stat.
1027 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(2) (2000)).
80. 50 C.F.R. § 18.3 (2000).
81. 55 Fed. Reg. 14,973 (1990); 53 Fed. Reg. 45,788-90 (1988).
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When FWS agents seized articles of clothing made from sea otter
pelts from Marina Katelnikoff, an Aleut,82 she sued, but the district
83
After this decision, FWS agents
court upheld the regulation.
seized a parka and hat from Boyd Didrickson, a Tlingit, claiming
that these items were not traditional because they included metal
84
snaps and zippers. In a suit brought by Didrickson and joined by
Katelnikoff, the district court reconsidered what constituted a tra85
ditional item under the statute. The court held that a finding that
sea otter products were not traditional native handicrafts
is based upon a strained interpretation of the word “traditional” . . . . [T]he Government’s position is that . . . “traditional” native handicrafts are only those items commonly produced for commercial sale within “living memory” before 1972.
Hence the regulation creates an artificial time period from
roughly 1900 through 1972 within which the search for traditional Alaskan native articles is limited. This rationale turns
on
86
its head any ordinary conception of the word “traditional.”

The court pointed out the inherent unfairness in expecting Natives
to conform to an essentially purist definition of tradition:
The fact that Alaskan natives were prevented, by circumstances
beyond their control, from exercising a tradition for a given period of time does not mean that it has been lost forever or that it
has become any less a “tradition.” It defies common sense to define “traditional” in such a way that only those traditions that
were exercised during a comparatively short period in history
87
could qualify as “traditional.”

What is gained when longstanding practices are protected as
traditional simply because they are longstanding? Is there anything
inherently valuable about the way things have always been done?
The primary benefit appears to be the development of a shared
sense of community and identity among adherents to the tradition,
and the concomitant opportunity to perpetuate that shared sense
over time. Protecting longstanding traditions ensures the maintenance of practices valuable either in themselves or because of the
sense of belonging that they foster among individuals engaging in
the same practices. Longstanding traditions promote pride in a
heritage in part created by the existence of the tradition. In this

82. Katelnikoff v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 657 F. Supp. 659, 661
(D. Alaska 1986).
83. Id. at 667.
84. Didrickson v. United States Dep’t. of the Interior, 796 F. Supp. 1281, 1284
(D. Alaska 1991).
85. Id. at 1289.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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way, tradition’s time dimension is often inextricably linked with a
social or cultural dimension.
Engaging in a longstanding practice sometimes confers a sense
of entitlement. The NPS referred to such an entitlement of Tlingit
Indians who had long inhabited the area in and around Glacier Bay
National Monument as a “moral claim . . . based on historical use
88
and cultural ties.” Protecting such traditions benefits individuals
in numerous ways, for example, by maintaining their sense of
autonomy and personal pride, and the larger community gains
when individual members’ personal sense of value is sustained.
Protecting longstanding traditions simply because they are longstanding, however, presents the risk of perpetuating exploitive, discriminatory or otherwise harmful practices. In addition, because
the level of scientific understanding about the natural world is constantly increasing, longstanding traditions may conflict with new
knowledge. For example, recent research suggests that longstanding traditional practices such as egg-collecting for subsistence or for
religious ceremonies may have a detrimental effect on the resource
89
if the birds’ nesting and feeding patterns are disturbed.
B. Traditional Activities as Small in Scale
Legislative exemptions for participation in traditional activities also typically appear to contemplate a small scale. Courts have
consistently refused to uphold special privileges for individuals, including Natives, who in effect have chosen to enter the modern
economy by attempting to compete on a larger scale. The
ANILCA amendments defined “customary trade” as the limited
and noncommercial exchange of wildlife or wildlife parts in mini90
mal quantities. The amendments clearly did not contemplate a
91
Similarly, state subsistence regulations
large-scale operation.
92
specify noncommercial enterprises.
88. THEODORE CATTON, LAND REBORN: A HISTORY OF ADMINISTRATION
VISITOR USE IN GLACIER BAY NATIONAL PARK AND PRESERVE 124 (1995),
available at http://www.nps.gov/glba/adhi/adhi.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
89. See, e.g., Stephani G. Zador & John F. Piatt, Populations and Productivity
of Seabirds at South Marble Island, Glacier Bay, Alaska, during May-July 1999,
U.S.G.S. Biological Div. (Sept. 1999) (introductory report for an upcoming study
of the effects of Tlingit egg harvesting practices within Glacier Bay National Park)
(on file with author).
90. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-83, § 316(b)(4), 111 Stat. 1543, 1593 (1997) (repealed 1998).
91. Federal regulations permitting “customary trade” in subsistence-caught
fish so long as the sale does not constitute a “significant commercial enterprise”
are currently being clarified because ambiguity in terminology has led to confuAND
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Maintaining that traditional activities must be small in scale
reduces pressures on limited resources. State and federal resource
laws evidence concern for preserving the target resource, even to
the detriment of other important values. For example, traditional
activities privileges under ANILCA may be suspended if they are
93
likely to have a negative impact on the natural resource. Other
benefits gained by limiting traditional practices to those performed
by individuals or small groups include a greater ability of practitioners to transmit to others the skills associated with the traditional
practice, as well as the ability to monitor the allocation of the bene94
fits of group membership and to keep out interlopers.
However, limiting the scale of traditional activities may create
a dilemma for at least some potential beneficiaries of traditional
activities privileges. Longstanding practices of some Native cultural groups have never been strictly limited to small-scale activities. Harvesting resources on a large scale has as much cultural
worth as small-scale harvesting—perhaps more, because large-scale
harvesting often brings an entire community together, and the
fruits of such labors are typically shared among entire social or kin95
Similarly, the exchange of resources for cash
ship networks.
should not automatically disqualify the transaction from being considered traditional. Refusal to recognize an exchange of resources
for cash as appropriately “traditional” stems from romantic illusions about the nature of Native societies. Although barter was
long the means of exchange among Natives, such groups moved to
exchanges for cash early in their histories of contact with Europeans; it is nonsensical to hold that only non-cash exchange transactions can be traditional for Native cultures.

sion and possible abuses. A Task Force of the Federal Subsistence Board noted
that “[t]he importance of clarifying the term ‘Customary Trade’ cannot be overstated. The Task Force feels that the retention of the current regulatory language
would invite abuse from those who wish to use subsistence-harvested fish for
monetary gain, to the detriment of subsistence uses and users.” Proposed Regulations for Customary Trade, Briefing Prepared for Fall 2001 Regional Advisory
Council Meetings, available at http://www.subsistmgtinfo.org/ ctd.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2002). The Task Force hopes to adopt a Final Rule by June 2002. Id.
92. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 99.010(b)(1), (4) (1982).
93. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3170(a) (2000) (allowing access to be withheld where
such uses would be detrimental to the area’s resource values).
94. See, e.g., James M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 141, 142 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2d ed.
1995).
95. Jeremy David Sacks, Culture, Cash or Calories: Interpreting Alaska Native
Subsistence Rights, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 247, 250 (1995).
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The position that traditional activities must be small in scale
also may unfairly bind the people engaging in them. As several
commentators have noted, such a conception relegates Native
communities to “museum piece” status, forcing them to stay locked
96
in a static, no-growth pattern of activity. A more realistic picture
recognizes that culture is constantly changing and that Native
groups both affect and are affected by the society around them.
Attempting to identify the traditional activities of any particular
culture is often to aim at a moving target. One scholar, examining
the history of hill tribes in Bangladesh, criticizes a static conception
of culture by demonstrating the dynamic nature of cultural change:
[T]he idea of unchangeable tribes frozen in time cannot stand
the test of historical scrutiny . . . . [T]he present distribution of
different groups in the hills is far from “traditional.” Complex
patterns of migration into and out of the area have been occurring for centuries. Almost all of these people have been highly
mobile not just in the short term and over short distances . . . but
97
also over long distances and over a long span of time . . . .

It is not clear that such a static conception of tradition is necessary
for the preservation of what is unique about Native cultures, nor
that it is necessary to justify according such cultures special privileges. A judicial decision in Canada regarding the rights of Natives
to sell fish aptly expresses the view that traditional activities need
not be synonymous with a static, changeless past: “The Indian
right to trade his fish is not frozen in time . . . . [H]e is entitled . . .
to evolve with the times and dispose of them by modern means, if
98
he so chooses, such as the sale of them for money.”
The position that traditional Native activities are small in scale
is also historically flawed because many Native cultures historically
engaged in resource enterprises on a vast scale. In North America,
numerous pre-colonization Indian societies developed vast trading
99
networks that often stretched from one coast to the other. In
Alaska, long before the incursion of explorers and settlers of European descent, some Native tribes had developed systems for the
taking and exchange of wild resources that were anything but small
in scale. A Tlingit Indian prosecuted for violating the Lacey Act
pointed to this history in appealing his conviction in United States v.

96. Id. at 247, 252-53.
97. Willem Van Schendel, The Invention of the “Jummas”: State Formation
and Ethnicity in Southeastern Bangladesh, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF ASIA 121,
129-30 (R.H. Barnes et al. eds., 1995).
98. Regina v. Van der Peet, 83 C.C.C. 3d 289, 296 (1993).
99. See generally JACK WEATHERFORD, NATIVE ROOTS: HOW THE INDIANS
ENRICHED AMERICA 6-10 (1991).

TOMSEN_FMT.DOC

186

05/01/02 9:50 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[19:1

Skinna100 under state law limiting subsistence uses to those that are
noncommercial. Skinna argued that his crime, collecting and selling 32,000 pounds of herring spawn on kelp to a Canadian buyer,
was on a scale comparable to that traditionally engaged in by Tlingit and Haida Indians and that state law conflicted with ANILCA’s
101
However, because Skinna predefinition of customary trade.
sented no evidence to support this assertion, the court was not
102
called upon to evaluate his tradition-based claim.
103
In a later case, United States v. Alexander, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided that the “customary trade” protected by
104
ANILCA includes sales for cash. In Alexander, the resource use
was arguably large-scale; the defendants had harvested a thousand
pounds of herring roe on kelp, more than twice the amount for
which they had permits, and they had crossed both state and inter105
The Alexander court nonetheless
national lines to sell the roe.
decided that the defendants had shown that their activities fell
within the scope of customary trade “as practiced by their ancestors,” noting that a Haida elder had testified that for as long as he
could remember, Haidas had traded herring roe with other tribes
and with foreigners, going as far south as California to do so, and
106
that as early as 1913, this trade had included cash transactions.
An examination of the cases reveals unanswered questions.
First, while there is a dramatic difference in scale between the activities of Skinna (32,000 pounds of herring roe sold for $91,000)
and those of the Alexander defendants (1,000 pounds of roe that
were seized before they could be sold), neither court attempted to
set boundaries for the permissible scale of customary trade. How
small in scale must an operation be to qualify as traditional? The
dissenting judge expressed the opinion that the Alexander defendants’ activity should not be considered small-scale:
Let it first be said that we are not dealing with a person who
simply sought to subsist on a fishery closed to all but subsistence
users. We deal with individuals who sought to make a great deal
of money by taking an enormous quantity of herring spawn on
kelp, and who only failed in their goal because they were as in-

100. 931 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1991). At the time of Skinna’s conviction, ANILCA
had not yet been amended to include the word “noncommercial” in its definition
of subsistence use.
101. Id. at 532.
102. Id.
103. 938 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1991).
104. Id. at 946.
105. Id. at 944-45.
106. Id. at 948-49.
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Second, Skinna did not defend his assertion that the very large
scale of his activity was traditional among his people. Given evidence of large-scale resource harvesting and vast trading networks
among native peoples throughout the history of North America, it
seems well within the realm of possibility that very large resource
harvests may have been practiced historically among Tlingits and
Haidas in Alaska. If Skinna had presented evidence sufficient to
support this assertion, would the courts have been prepared to rec108
ognize similar harvests today as traditional activities?
C. Tradition as Associated with Culture and Community
In the laws governing resource use in Alaska, tradition is frequently associated with the concept of Native culture or with an
identifiable social community. The rhetoric of tradition is often
employed to advocate preserving a unique culture or community
and allowing its members to continue doing what makes them
unique—engaging in traditional activities that differentiate their
group from more recent dominant cultures or groups.
Traditional practices as defining features of a culture are frequently maintained through a passing down from generation to
generation of skills and values. For example, the Joint Boards’
regulations identifying customary and traditional subsistence uses
require “a pattern of taking or use that includes the handing down
of knowledge of fishing or hunting skills, values, and lore from
109
generation to generation.” The Alaska Supreme Court clarified
that this intergenerational transfer need not be intrafamilial or
110
even occur within a settled community. In Payton v. State, the
court reviewed the Board of Fisheries’ rejection of a proposal for a
subsistence fishery in part because the Board determined that the
area had not been the site of customary and traditional uses of fish
111
for subsistence purposes. The explanation of the Board Chair for
his vote suggested a common perception that traditional uses occur
among interrelated members of a settled community:
I note that many [communities at the site] . . . aren’t even the
same communities that people lived in prior to the 1950’s. I note
107. Id. at 949 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
108. The Alexander court appeared to consider Skinna as a possible example of
an operation too large in scale to be considered traditional regardless of the evidence Skinna might have presented, because ANILCA specifies a subsistence
purpose for permissible customary trade activities. Id. at 948.
109. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 99.010(b)(6) (2001).
110. 938 P.2d 1036 (Alaska 1997).
111. Id. at 1040-41.
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. . . a transient population that comes and goes . . . . I can’t
find . . . that there’s any sort of large proportion of people
who’ve lived here for long enough to even have established a
112
generation to generation customary and traditional use.

Similarly, the Board noted in support of its decision that
[a]lthough the area has been continuously populated by a small
number of year-round residents since the 1920’s, there is no evidence that families remained in the area for more than one generation . . . . The board believes that the current subsistence law
was designed to protect ongoing uses of fish and fishing practices—practices that existed in the the [sic] distant past and have
113
been carried on through successive generations.

The supreme court, however, decided that the continuity of the
practice, rather than the continuity of the people, was what
counted: “We conclude that the Board did not err in considering
the presence of ‘successive generations,’ but that it did err when it
required the current users of salmon to be related to past generations of users . . . . [W]e consistently have interpreted ‘customary
114
and traditional’ to refer to ‘uses’ rather than ‘users.’” The court
considered it sufficient that the residents who proposed the fishery
learned subsistence skills and values from long-time residents of
115
the area, even though they were not related to those residents.
Another Alaska Supreme Court case illustrates a dilemma
faced by individuals practicing a traditional activity characterized
in part by the intergenerational transfer of knowledge. State v.
116
Kluti Kaah Native Village of Copper Center was a suit brought by
Alaska Native villagers when the Board of Game eliminated their
extended moose hunting season in favor of a seven-day general
sport hunt in which the villagers could participate. The Natives argued in part that the shortened general hunt would not afford them
the opportunity to pass their heritage on to their children. The supreme court vacated an injunction suspending the general hunt,
holding that the harm to competing interests, such as those of the
State (in its capacity as steward of the resource), sport hunters and
other subsistence hunters could be significant if Native village resi117
dents were allowed to hunt for a longer period than were others.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rabinowitz maintained that in establishing
the length of the hunt, the Board was obligated to consider the village’s historical hunting period, which had in the past extended as
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1039 (quoting Gary Slaven, Chair of the Board of Fisheries).
Id. at 1039-42.
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1044.
831 P.2d 1270 (Alaska 1992).
Id. at 1274.
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long as fifty days. Justice Rabinowitz argued that a refusal to consider fully this tradition amounted to a failure to protect subsistence uses, as the Board was obligated to do by statute:
There is no question that the traditional Ahtna method of hunting this game population encompassed much more protracted
opportunities to engage in this activity with the younger generation. To compress the long standing custom into a sport hunter’s
seven-day “vacation” is to legislate a substantial
departure from
118
the historical subsistence hunting experience.

This case seems to undermine the idea that the handing down of
knowledge from generation to generation is an important cultural
aspect of tradition. If intergenerational knowledge transfer is indeed a requirement for some traditional activities, then individuals
wishing to engage in traditional activities must not be foreclosed
from fulfilling one of the essential requirements of such activities.
The concept of traditional activities is also frequently associated with indigenousness. The MMPA extends protections for traditional activities to Alaska Natives only. The subsistence provisions of ANILCA were originally intended solely for Alaska
Natives, but this stipulation changed after the State objected that
such a provision would violate the state constitution, which ex119
The
tended a right to a subsistence lifestyle to all Alaskans.
Alaska legislature noted that “customary and traditional uses of
120
Alaska’s fish and game originated with Alaska Natives.” A senator from Alaska alluded to the association of tradition and Native
culture in explaining the exemption for Alaska Natives in the bill
that became the MMPA: “Native Alaskans are proud. They do not
ask for special treatment . . . . But, nonetheless, they, too, have the
right to be let alone, to follow their traditional way of life. It is this
121
way of life I seek to protect in this bill.” This rhetorically powerful association has proven difficult to implement consistently.
Outside Alaska, the concept of indigenousness is problematic.
Groups are defined as “indigenous” or “Native” by reference to
amorphous criteria that do not necessarily apply even to groups
commonly recognized as Native. Although progress in developing
legally and politically acceptable criteria is slow, the U.N. Working
Group on Indigenous Populations described the relevant factors in
understanding the term “indigenous” as the following: (1) priority

118. Id. at 1275 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
119. Jane Langley McConnell, 1990 Ninth Circuit Environmental Review:
Alaska Natives, 21 ENVTL. L. 1275, 1286 n.58 (1991).
120. Act of July 14, 1992, 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws ch.1 § 1(a)(3) (legislative history of the 1992 amendments to the subsistence laws).
121. Case, supra note 62, at 1014.
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in time; (2) voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness by
group members; (3) self-identification of members with the group;
and (4) experience of marginalization of the group by the now122
dominant culture or cultures. While such criteria certainly help,
they are not self-explanatory. For example, who decides when a
group has been “marginalized,” and what does “marginalization”
look like? How does one measure the value of a behavior or outlook to a group’s self-identity?
In Alaska, problems may arise in determining whether a particular individual belongs to a statutorily recognized Native group.
Although federal law defines a “Native” of Alaska as “a citizen of
the United States who is a person of one-fourth degree or more
Alaska Indian, . . . Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or combination
123
thereof,” this categorization also includes “any citizen of the
United States who is regarded as an Alaska Native by the Native
village or town of which he claims to be a member and whose father or mother is (or, if deceased, was) regarded as Native by any
124
Thus the question of memberNative village or Native town.”
ship is a subjective as well as an objective determination.
If identifying the contours of membership in a Native culture
is difficult, determining what kinds of activities are characteristic of
that culture is even more problematic. This determination implicates tradition’s time dimension—how far back in a group’s history
must we look for traditional activities?—and its scale dimension—
how involved may a Native become in systems and economies beyond the Native group and still have his or her activities considered
traditional? The example of the Tlingit Indians who have historically occupied the village of Hoonah near what was then Glacier
125
Bay National Monument illustrates the difficulty in deciding
whether activities may appropriately be attributed to a Native culture. In developing management plans and policies for the monument over the years following its designation, NPS had attempted
to protect the traditional activities of the Tlingit, but the agency
found that its concept of the Tlingits’ traditional activities was not
126
In the 1930s and
the same as that of the Tlingits themselves.
1940s, for example, Hoonah villagers made their living both by
122. Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eleventh
Session, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Annex I, at 50, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993).
123. 50 C.F.R. § 18.3 (2000).
124. Id.
125. The Monument has now become part of Glacier Bay National Park.
126. See generally CATTON, supra note 88, at 100-32.
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harvesting wild foods and by earning cash.127 During this period
and through World War II, Tlingits earned cash through seasonal
employment as fishermen and cannery workers; aided by federal
loans, many Tlingit men bought their own commercial fishing
128
Tlingits also engaged in seal kills for bounty payments,
boats.
and many, if not most, of the animals killed were simply returned
for the bounty rather than consumed or used by the Native
129
hunter. In these and other ways, “the Tlingits’ traditional subsistence activities became intertwined with the cash sector of their
economy . . . . [T]heir identity as indigenous hunters and gatherers
130
coalesced with their identity as industrial workers.” To outsiders
looking in, commercial and industrial activities and cash sales of
animals conflicted with traditional practices of a Native culture.
The Natives themselves, however,
did not view their mixed economy as a juxtaposition of old and
new elements, but rather as a synthesis of the two . . . . [W]hen
whites observed Tlingits hunting with rifles and taking only the
scalp of the seal for the bounty, they saw a corruption of aboriginal Indian culture, a grafting of the artificial onto the natural
in the Indians’ relationship to his [sic] environment. Hoonah
131
Tlingits had no such conception of their seal hunting.

An NPS staff biologist who studied Tlingit seal hunting practices in Glacier Bay during 1945-46 concluded that because the Natives no longer traveled in canoes or hunted with bow and arrow
but instead used gasoline-powered fishing boats and rifles, they
could no longer validly exercise their traditional use rights in the
132
This conclusion “ignored the historical contiMonument area.
nuity that underlay Tlingit cultural change. Few Tlingits would
have agreed . . . that they had ‘forsaken their ancestral way of
133
When a small number of Hoonah Natives began taking
life.’”
one hundred or more seals every season between 1963 and 1965,
NPS saw them as different from other local Tlingits because they
134
were engaging in the market economy. The Park Superintendent
claimed that these “hide hunters” in large fishing boats “were not
real Indians,” even though Tlingits in the area had been market
135
Comhunting as well as subsistence hunting for generations.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 104
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 109-11.
Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 199.
Id.
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pounding the difficulty of reconciling these competing conceptions
of what is traditional was the fact that, particularly for past practices, the NPS’s records of the scale, frequency and relative importance of particular resource uses by the Tlingits differed from the
Tlingits’ own recollections. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, NPS assumed that Native uses of Glacier Bay were minimal
and of negligible importance to the Hoonah economy because of
the low number of Natives requesting seal hunting permits and the
small percentage of local Natives (ten percent) who responded to
NPS’s threatened termination of their privileges in the Bay in
136
1964. However, respondents to a 1986 survey of Hoonah households by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game estimated that
fifty-five percent of their households’ annual subsistence take dur137
These figing that period had come from the Monument area.
ures demonstrate “a huge disparity . . . in the perceptions of Natives and NPS personnel over the extent of past Native use of the
138
resources—that will probably never be reconciled.” This example calls into question other traditional activity determinations that
may be based on similarly erroneous or conflicting data.
Subsistence activities, defined by reference to tradition in numerous provisions of Alaskan resource law, are also frequently associated with the concept of indigenous or Native culture. Protecting traditional practices in the form of subsistence activities
supports and perpetuates the structures of entire cultures. For example, subsistence policy under ANILCA is premised primarily
139
upon cultural assumptions, including the roles that subsistence
activities play in group bonding, self-identification and social structure. That subsistence activities among Alaska Natives represent
more than simply a means of survival is aptly illustrated in one
author’s explanation of why the term “subsistence” has “come to
stand for the traditional Alaska Native way of life”:
The traditional economy is based on subsistence activities that
require special skills and a complex understanding of the local
environment that enables people to live directly from the land.
It also involves cultural values and attitudes: mutual respect,
sharing, resourcefulness, and an understanding that is both conscious and mystical of the intricate interrelationships that link
140
humans, animals, and the environment.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 199.
Sacks, supra note 95, at 265.
Case, supra note 62, at 1009.
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Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court noted the central cultural role
of subsistence activities for many Alaskan Natives: “Not only is the
game of prime importance in furnishing the bare necessities of life,
but subsistence hunting is at the core of the cultural tradition of
many of these people. It has been claimed that their very lifestyle
is threatened if they are deprived of this traditional method of ob141
taining the wherewithal for existence.”
Among Native groups in Alaska, subsistence activities frequently define communities and social and economic units, typically linked on the basis of kinship. The distribution and exchange
of resources take place within community networks involving
142
nearly every person in every village. The membership of political
institutions is often determined by membership in subsistence
groups, and the organization of these groups shapes marriage and
143
residence patterns for members. Subsistence is a way of life for
such groups and encompasses values and modes of living and relating to other people and the natural world. Therefore, subsistence is part of the collection of group values and practices that define the group and that may be perpetuated generation by
generation. This larger sociocultural role for subsistence activities
144
was recognized in Bobby v. State, where the court examined
Alaska’s subsistence laws and asserted that in determining whether
subsistence activities should be given priority in a particular area,
“[n]eed is not the standard . . . . [I]t matters not that other food
145
sources may be available at any given time or place.”
One of the primary factors confusing the interpretations of
tradition in Alaskan resource law, however, is that subsistence has
a dual meaning. The plain meaning of subsistence is simply the direct dependence on land and water resources for the necessities of
life. This is the meaning associated with subsistence activities as
practiced by many Alaskans for whom the resources they harvest
provide a significant portion of their income or household and sustenance needs. In contrast, for Alaska Natives harvesting resources in accordance with patterns, skills and methods passed
141. State v. Tanana Valley Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc., 583 P.2d 854, 859 n.18
(Alaska 1978).
142. M. Lynne Bruzzese, Comment, U.S. v. Alexander: Defining and Regulating “Subsistence Use” of Resources Among Alaska Natives, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.
461, 486 (1993).
143. Christopher V. Panoff, Chapter, In re The Exxon Valdez Alaska Native
Class v. Exxon Corp.: Cultural Resources, Subsistence Living, and the Special Injury Rule, 28 ENVT’L L. 701, 724 (1998).
144. 718 F. Supp. 764 (D. Alaska 1989).
145. Id. at 778.
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from generation to generation (typically surrounded with ceremonial or social significance), subsistence activities are incorporated
within the action, and the actions themselves help to define an entire cultural framework. Both federal law and Alaska law blur the
distinctions between these two meanings of subsistence. Some
provisions protect subsistence activities out of an apparent concern
for the welfare of those who depend on them for sustenance, while
others elevate subsistence activities to privileged status simply because those activities are traditional. One commentator criticizes
the culture-based aspects of subsistence privileges as applied to
Alaska Natives, claiming that such laws “may not be compatible
with either Native needs or rational resource use . . . . At one extreme, such laws may allow Native subsistence rights to thwart sensible resource management, while at the other, they may artificially
146
arrest Native culture in a mythical past.”
Another cultural aspect of tradition emerges in Native practices associated with religious or spiritual ceremonies. For example, Natives are permitted to kill moose in limited numbers for use
in funeral potlatches, a sacred ritual of ancient origin that takes
147
place within a Native community after a member’s death. Such
practices, like subsistence activities, support and perpetuate a cultural group’s shared values, social relations and identity.
Traditional activities with a religious purpose may conflict
with other values, such as the protection of a scarce resource. Recent controversies in two national monuments illustrate such conflicts. For centuries, Wupatki National Monument in Arizona was
148
tribal territory of the Hopi Indians. The Hopi, who believe that
the eaglets are messengers between the physical and spiritual
worlds, recently became the center of controversy when the Department of the Interior decided that they should be allowed to
continue their traditional practice of gathering protected golden
149
eagle hatchlings for ritual sacrifice. Decision-makers had to balance respect for Hopi culture and the Natives’ interest in religious
freedom with the public’s interest in protecting rare creatures and
maintaining the national monument as a natural system free from
150
human depredations.
At Devils Tower National Monument in Wyoming, Native
American tribes perform traditional religious and cultural ceremo146. Sacks, supra note 95, at 252.
147. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1069-70 (Alaska 1979).
148. Andrew C. Revkin, U.S. Plan Would Sacrifice Baby Eagles to Hopi Ritual,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, at 14.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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nies.151 Devils Tower has also become a popular rock climbing site,
152
drawing more than 6,000 climbers each year. The sheer number
of climbers and their actions—fixing bolts and pitons in the rock,
shouting to one another and even taking pictures of ongoing Native
ceremonies—has caused Native people to complain “that the presence of rock climbers has adversely impacted their traditional ac153
tivities and seriously impaired the spiritual quality of the site.”
The imposition by the NPS of a voluntary ban on climbing
during June, the most culturally significant month for Natives, gave
154
rise to a lawsuit brought by the affected climbers. The climbers
also referenced tradition by pointing to the history of rock climbing
155
on the Tower, beginning as far back as 1893. Although the suit
was dismissed because the voluntary nature of the ban meant that
156
the climbers had not suffered injury in fact, the case demonstrates
powerfully the kind of interests that may compete with the values
embodied in traditional activities.
Much of the impetus for protecting traditional activities with a
cultural dimension stems from the value in cultural diversity. Associating tradition exclusively with indigenousness seems consistent
with the intent of many federal laws to preserve or restore rights
for Native peoples so that their cultures will not be completely lost
157
through assimilation by the dominant surrounding cultures. Such
goals are based upon an understanding that unique cultures are
valuable both independently and as part of our shared national
heritage, and that their existence promotes important societal val158
ues such as tolerance of diverse views and lifestyles.
Associating tradition with culture also stems from a realization
that Native groups often possess special knowledge and under151. Kelly Latimer, Tenth Circuit Denies Rock Climbers Standing to Sue Over
Devils Tower Voluntary Ban on Climbing, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
114, 115 (2000).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 815 (10th Cir.
1999).
155. Latimer, supra note 151, at 116; Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n, 175 F.3d
at 818.
156. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n, 175 F.3d at 822.
157. An example of this intention is the decision by the International Whaling
Commission to restore traditional whaling opportunities for Makah Natives living
in coastal Washington, leading to the tribe’s first gray whale kill in 1999. The
Commission’s decision has not been universally applauded. Sam Howe Verhovek,
Reviving Tradition, Tribe Kills a Whale, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, at A18.
158. See A. Dan Tarlock, Can Cowboys Become Indians? Protecting Western
Communities as Endangered Cultural Remnants, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 539, 556 (1999).

TOMSEN_FMT.DOC

196

05/01/02 9:50 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[19:1

standing, particularly of the natural environment around them.
This knowledge, developed through the experience of many generations, is based upon intimate familiarity with and reliance upon
the land and its resources. Their accumulated knowledge allows
Native groups to survive in often harsh environments. For example, Yupik Eskimos living in central Alaska developed an immense
variety of words to describe the snow and ice around them and an
elaborate set of tools for manipulating, trimming and shaping the
159
snow blocks used for shelter.
Traditional practices within indigenous communities have often developed as the means of transmitting these kinds of understandings. Taboos based upon sustainable ecological principles,
such as prohibitions on the killing of pregnant or nursing female
game animals or spatial restrictions limiting fishing to certain areas,
160
Prowere woven into traditional resource harvesting practices.
tecting traditional activities that embody such knowledge ensures
the continued availability of this knowledge both within and outside the cultural group. Maintaining these values is often consistent with maintaining the continued viability of wildlife populations
and other natural resources.
Associating tradition solely with indigenousness fails to account for the fact that the values of cultural diversity, cultural heritage and specialized cultural knowledge are not exclusively associated with indigenous groups. Unique social groups are sometimes
161
History is recreated by distinctive local or regional practices.
plete with examples in which a common practice creates a “subculture” of shared identity and group norms, a subculture that is
162
threatened when its traditional practices are not protected. Loggers in the Pacific Northwest and cattle ranchers in the Southwest
are examples of this phenomenon. Nostalgia for the skills, practices and community atmosphere that may be lost if these subcultures were to disappear is a manifestation of the value of tradition
163
even where indigenousness is not a factor. In Alaska, commercial
fishermen in Glacier Bay see themselves as just such a threatened
159. See Joel Sherzer, A Richness of Voices, in AMERICA IN 1492: THE WORLD
PEOPLES BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF COLUMBUS 251, 255 (Alvin M.
Josephy, Jr., ed., 1993).
160. See generally Johan Colding & Carl Folke, The Taboo System: Lessons
About Informal Institutions for Nature Management, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L.
REV. 413 (2000).
161. See generally Tarlock, supra note 158, at 550-58 (discussing the cultural
claims of “at-risk” communities of western ranchers and western irrigators).
162. See generally id.
163. See id.
OF THE INDIAN
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subculture if regulations prevent them from continuing their traditional practices of fishing in the Bay.164 In addition, Natives are not
the exclusive purveyors of the desirable values that accompany tradition’s sociocultural dimension. In considering revisions to the
state’s subsistence laws, the Alaska state legislature noted:
there are Alaskans, both Native and non-Native, who have a
traditional, social, or cultural relationship to and dependence
upon wild renewable resources . . . . Although customs, traditions, and beliefs vary, these Alaskans share ideals of respect for
nature, the importance of using resources wisely, and the value
and dignity of a way of life in which they use Alaska’s fish and
165
game for a substantial portion of their sustenance.

Nevertheless, there still seems to be room for debate about
whether the cultural dimension of tradition, at least when associated with subsistence activities, ought to embody indigenousness
because the role of traditional subsistence activities for Natives is
somehow special. This claim was made by the Alaska Native plaintiffs in The Exxon Valdez Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corpora166
The class, made up of 3,455 Alaska Natives, sued Exxon
tion.
Shipping Company and Exxon Corporation for damage to their
subsistence way of life when the oil tanker The Exxon Valdez ran
aground in Prince William Sound. The accident spilled eleven million gallons of oil and caused ecological and economic devasta167
tion. The Native class claimed that the oil spill harmed “an integrated system of communal subsistence . . . inextricably bound up
not only with the harvesting of natural resources damaged by the
spill but also with the exchange, sharing and processing of those resources as the foundation of an established economic, social and
168
religious structure.” The plaintiffs asked the Ninth Circuit to decide that damage to the subsistence way of life of Alaska Natives
was a “special injury,” distinct from injuries suffered by other
169
Alaskans engaging in subsistence activities. The court of appeals
refused, holding that the difference was only in the degree of in170
jury.

164. See generally CATTON, supra note 88, at 273-90.
165. Act of July 14, 1992, ch. 1, § (a)(1)-(2), 1992 Alaska Laws 2d Sp. Sess.,
H.B. No. 601.
166. 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997).
167. Panoff, supra note 143, at 703.
168. Exxon Valdez Alaska Native Class, 104 F.3d at 1198.
169. Id. at 1197.
170. Id.
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V. WHO WILL INTERPRET TRADITION IN ALASKA?
Who should be the final arbiter in Alaska of what tradition
means? What institution or entity should be given the primary responsibility for ensuring appropriate consideration for and balancing of the spectrum of values embodied in the concept of tradition?
Will the answer vary, depending on whether the statutory law in
question is state or federal? Whose perspective matters in deciding
what is and what is not traditional?
Looking to the affected individuals or group for their conceptions of their traditions is an option, but the affected parties will
almost certainly be guided by self-interest in making those determinations. As the example of the Tlingits in Glacier Bay sug171
gests, however, an agency such as the NPS may not be a more
“neutral” arbiter and may be influenced by its own assumptions
and priorities. The considerable overlap in terminology and purpose between state and federal laws governing resource uses in
Alaska complicates the question of whose interpretation should be
given deference. This is especially so in the area of traditional subsistence uses, where the State has in the past and may again implement federal law on federal lands in Alaska. Under the Chevron
standard, a court should defer to an administrative agency’s construction of a statute where the agency is entrusted with admini172
In the Snowmobile litigation, however,
stration of that statute.
the snowmobiling interests argued that NPS’s interpretation of traditional activities should be given no deference because it was
173
based on “political as opposed to factual decision-making.”
State agencies, boards, and local councils have the advantage
over courts and legislatures of being “on the ground” with the resources and therefore are perhaps best able to ensure that in assigning traditional access and use privileges, the health and values
of the underlying resources are maintained. These may be the best
entities to represent local interests.
The disadvantage of such state and local entities is that they
may be more subject to undue pressures from local interest groups.
Such was the Ninth Circuit’s suspicion in a pre-McDowell suit
brought by residents of the increasingly urbanized Kenai Peninsula
who argued that the Joint Boards’ definition of “rural” in prefer171. See infra p. 189.
172. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
173. Oral Argument on Pending Summ. J. Mots. at 4, Alaska State Snowmobile
Ass’n, Inc. v. Babbitt, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Alaska 1999) (No. A99-0059-CV)
(statement of William P. Horn for plaintiff Alaska State Snowmobile Association,
Inc.).
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encing rural subsistence uses excluded them from engaging in legitimate subsistence activities.174 The court concluded that the
principal effect of the Joint Boards’ definition of “rural” as an area
other than a community with a population of 7,000 or more “was to
deny the subsistence fishing priority to residents of areas domi175
nated by a cash economy.”
As a result, the Kenaitze tribe could not continue the subsistence fishing and hunting they had engaged in for hundreds of
years because the Kenai Peninsula, located near Anchorage, had
become a prime area of commercial and sport fishing, with an
176
economy now dominated by cash. This was an unfair result in an
area whose 25,000 inhabitants are spread over 16,000 square miles,
said the court, which then declared that “[t]he state has attempted
to take away what Congress has given, adopting a creative redefinition of the word rural, a redefinition whose transparent purpose is
177
to protect commercial and sport fishing interests.”
In determining the appropriate definition, the Kenaitze court
refused to defer either to the interpretation of the statute offered
by the Secretary of the Interior or to that of the State. The court
considered the State’s argument for deference on the ground that
with regard to ANILCA, the State “performs functions not unlike
those of a federal agency charged with implementing an Act of
178
The court rejected the argument, however, noting
Congress.”
that “[w]hile Alaska has a long history of managing large wilderness areas, it lacks the expertise in implementing federal laws and
policies and the nationwide perspective characteristic of a federal
179
The court noted that state regulatory activity is not
agency.”
subject to congressional oversight and that the State is not dele180
gated any authority under ANILCA. The court considered the
Interior Secretary’s familiarity with the statutory scheme but nevertheless determined that deference to the Secretary’s views was
181
not necessary. After the state regulatory scheme is in place, the
Secretary is authorized only to monitor and not to evaluate the

174. See Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1988).
175. Id. at 314.
176. Id. at 313.
177. Id. at 318. A decision in June 2001 returned the Kenai Peninsula to “rural” status, with the result that only about 9,000 residents qualify for federal subsistence privileges. See Federal Board Says Kenai Peninsula is Nonrural, ALASKA,
Nov. 2001, at 58.
178. Kenaitze, 860 F.2d at 315-16.
179. Id. at 316.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 315.
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State’s compliance with ANILCA’s provisions.182 The court’s reasoning in deciding that state interpretations merited no deference is
questionable. Unlike most federal statutes, ANILCA is statespecific; its provisions address only public lands in Alaska and no
attempt is made or needed to harmonize the statute’s approach in
Alaska with approaches taken elsewhere. While ANILCA is a
federal statute, and the interests the law protects are not statespecific, it nevertheless seems that decision-makers ought at least
to be guided to some extent by the State’s interpretations of a statute directed at lands wholly within that state.
VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of a definition or definitions for tradition as the term
is used to refer to traditional activities, resource uses and access to
resources has created difficulties for decision-makers who must
balance the competing values the concept invokes. These difficulties can be expected to recur because of the prevalence of the concept in state and federal law. Complicating the task of interpretation are the conflicts among competing values invoked by tradition
as well as the inability of any single definition of tradition to encompass adequately the full range of interests that deserve protection. Two steps should aid decision-makers in the process of developing workable solutions to the problems of interpreting
tradition: (1) identifying and articulating the full range of underlying and potentially competing values that a given invocation of tradition seeks to protect; and (2) deciding what institution or entity is
best suited to interpret tradition in particular contexts and giving
appropriate deference to the judgment of that institution or entity
in its interpretation.
Jennifer L. Tomsen

182. Id.

